. The flight directors were not turned off but appeared to be because the command bars disappeared briefly, but returned later with unreliable commands.Lateral oscillations which persist throughout the descent are probably due to the fact that in Alternate Law, roll control changed to Direct Law, but the pitch axis remained in Normal Law (without the protections); a unique and possibly difficult mix for the pilots to master in a short time.Expectation that AOA protection was available and training in it’s use, plus possibly other stall recovery training which did not emphasize immediate AOA reduction, are most likely the major cause of the PF’s first actions which led to the deep stall condition.

Thu., July 5, 2012 timer 4 min. it would have delayed his sleep by no more than 15 minutes, and because of his experience, maybe the story would have ended differently,” chief French investigator Alain Bouillard told VF. By Tim Newcomb July 05, 2012. Read Later. . Send to Kindle . Just three seconds before the crash, one pilot finally realized they were going to hit, saying, “Damn it, we’re going to crash, this can’t be true!” The plane struck the water belly first.Reports say that inadequate high-altitude training may have led to the pilot errors and chief investigator Alain Bouillard says that pilots simply needed to properly react to in-flight circumstances.

Air France Flight 447: Black Boxes Indicate Pilot Error Caused Accident Downtown Chicago under lockdown in wake of looting, violent unrestShots fired as crowds clash with police in downtown Chicago5 pandemic relief issues not addressed by Trump's executive actionsRecovered black box recorder offers new clues to why plane went down.

Maintaining a high AOA when ground impact is not imminent can result in an unrecoverable stall and/or inability to soften ground impact if the microburst exceeds the total performance capability of the aircraft.One factor mentioned in the accident report regarding pilot errors is that according to the Airbus Unreliable Speed Indications checklist (page 103) the autopilot, flight directors and auto-thrust should have been turned off.

Pilots were trained to use this by selecting TOGA (take off/go around) thrust and holding back stick input to achieve what was considered to be maximum performance—not really though because at the limiting AOA an aircraft is far up the back side of the drag curve which limits flight path performance as well as not allowing any extra lift force to be generated to redirect the flight path if it happens to be going in the wrong direction, i.e., down. The Wall Street Journal first reported that the crew failed to failed to fly the plane properly. At the time, in trying to prove the performance of aircraft at the limiting AOA, stall recovery training began with airlines teaching a technique which was supposed to minimize altitude loss. And when the plane made good on those threats and stalled out at 38,000 feet, the failed speed sensors further muddled the pilots’ decision making.In desperation, the pilots, with fully operational engines and an intact airframe, pointed the nose upward in the final minutes of the flight, but that move only exacerbated the stall. One characteristic of a “dynamic stall” identified by S.S. Hoerner in his book on Fluid Dynamics, is that the AOA at which the airflow re- attaches to the upper surface of the wing is considerably less than the AOA at initial stall. The icing caused the When they finally realized inaction was no longer acceptable, they were unsure of what to do.By piecing together data and voice recordings from the ‘black boxes’ salvaged from the crash site, investigators found that the plane took three minutes and 30 seconds to plummet into the ocean, with no warning given to passengers; data shows the oxygen masks were never deployed. Airbus, Air France and French investigators have refused to comment publically on the information from the black boxes.Turn on desktop notifications for breaking stories about interest? A German newspaper reports the captain rushed back into the cockpit shouting commands at his two co-pilots. Air France Flight 447: Pilot Errors Mounted in Tragic Crash, Report Finds. It may have been possible to roll the aircraft into a steep bank to get the nose to drop, but without correcting the elevator trim condition, the aircraft would probably have accelerated into another stall.The use of TOGA or nearly maximum thrust most of the time did not help. Pilot's cry as Air France jet plunged into Atlantic as final moments of doomed Flight 447 and its two sleeping pilots are revealed. As Langewiesche said; “. Robert had double the hours of Bonin, according to VF.The probe’s lead French investigator believes that Dubois would have properly navigated the storm, had he not been napping.“If the captain had stayed in position .

"In general, up at altitude, you don't have a lot of extra room," said Voss, "because the engines are producing just enough thrust to keep you there and you have a fairly small margin for where the nose can be tilted to maintain altitude." In the final report issued Thursday on the Air France 447 crash that killed 228 people in May 2009, investigators said the pilots were "completely surprised" … But now, the French probably are wishing those black boxes remained on the floor of the ocean, because its national airline is about to face some tough questions regarding the actions of its pilots on that flight. Released Thursday, the latest report essentially claims that as the plane’s speed sensors failed and stall warning alarms blared throughout the cockpit, the pilots, for unknown reasons, failed to act.