During this time the pilots certainly thought about ice — in fact, First Officer John Rachuba repeatedly turned on lights on the wings so he could look back and check for ice contamination. "Just under five seconds after the undercarriage left the ground, the plane's left wing scraped against the asphalt for 110 feet and the The left wing then separated from the body of the airplane, before the fuselage impacted with the edge of Flushing Bay and came to rest in a partially inverted position.Prior to impact, passengers did not assume the brace position. In fact, the minimum equipment list stated that the APU must be functional in order to take off, but neither the pilots nor the dispatcher had access to the minimum equipment list for the F28 and they did not know this.After landing in Dryden 45 minutes later, Captain Morwood refueled the plane, and was then observed having an angry conversation with Air Ontario managers about the situation. Investigators estimated that the plane took between 25 and 45 minutes to taxi from the gate to the runway.The first officer said it was "just like we lost lift. The flight crew was not aware of the exact delay that they would encounter before takeoff and their decision to leave the gate was reasonable. On the 10th of March 1989, Air Ontario flight 1363 failed to become airborne on takeoff from Dryden, Ontario and crashed into a forest, killing 24 of the 69 people on board. This represented a major regulatory oversight: how was it possible that two pilots who apparently knew so little about the capabilities of their aircraft in icing conditions ended up flying it in a harsh Canadian winter? The flight crew completed the Weather reports for LaGuardia showed that on the night of the accident, all taxiways were coated with a thin covering of snow. Passengers stated that they escaped through large holes in the cabin. (It is worth noting that the FAA dragged its feet on this recommendation because the installation of equipment near the runway posed a hazard in runway runoff scenarios. The commission preferred the use of Type 2 de-icing fluid, a gel that is applied cold, removing the ice and preventing the formation of new ice for up to 45 minutes. But after the de-icing, a further 20-minute delay occurred because one of the de-icing vehicles broke down behind the plane and prevented it from taxiing away from the gate. One of these recommendations was that so-called “Type 1” de-icing fluid be phased out. Morwood’s calculations showed that with these extra passengers and their bags, the plane would be over its maximum takeoff weight. Air Ontario had just acquired two F28s in 1987 and the crew that would be flying flight 1363 did not have much experience with the type. This article was originally posted to Reddit on 29 June 2019. It was in this environment that Air Ontario acquired the two Fokker F28 Fellowship aircraft, the first jets ever flown by the airline. Majure was initially hired as an F28 first officer by Piedmont Airlines in 1985. If they had known that ice could so easily cause a crash, they might have elected to cancel the flight. The ice contamination on the wings resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of control after lift-off. Some clambered up the seawall and staggered onto the runway, while others clung to floating wreckage and were picked up by firefighters who arrived on the scene almost immediately. Breaking apart as it went, flight 405 rolled over the seawall and crashed inverted into the shallow waters of Flushing Bay.The crash killed 12 people outright, but the remaining 39 were now faced with the simultaneous threats of burning and drowning. But neither pilot could see the ice because the amount that had formed, while certainly dangerous, was not visible from the cockpit, even though USAir crews universally believed that it would be.

Upon seeing the flames, he sounded an alarm, alerting the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police, who responded.The accident sent thick black smoke billowing above the airport as more than 200 emergency workers ... had to contend not only with blustery snow but the powerful icy current in Flushing Bay ... the tense drama of the rescue continued into the early hours, with fire-fighters and police officers in water up to their shoulders and helicopters shining spotlights on the wreckage and an ice-covered mound of earth at the end of the runway so slick the rescue workers needed metal ladders to walk across it.The NTSB report on the accident noted, but did not criticise, the medical operation at the scene. The accident led to a number of studies into the effect that ice has on aircraft, and several recommendations into prevention techniques.The 44-year-old pilot, Captain Wallace J. Majure II, who was fully qualified to pilot the F28 and four other commercial aircraft, had accumulated approximately 9,820 total flying hours, of which 2,200 hours were in the F28. Type 1 de-icing fluid is runny and is applied hot to the wings, removing the ice immediately but losing its effect after as little as six minutes. All the same, he was also portrayed as a by-the-book, cautious pilot.The first officer, John J. Rachuba, age 30, was hired by Piedmont in 1989. Captain Majure decided on a lower V1 speed than usual (that is, the speed above which the takeoff cannot be aborted) because of the possibility of slush on the runway. He and Mills also had plans the next day; cancelling the flight would be sure to sink them.