The first officer went to bed between 2300 and midnight on the night before the accident and awoke about 0430 on the day of the accident. NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California. He concluded that "...there must have been some sort of flag activity coming into view, disappearing from view, some time during the approach" and that the comments, although they did not convey information about the duration of any flag activity, indicated that "...there must have been enough absence of the flag for the crew to occasionally decide that the system was on the air when in fact it wasn't...."
About 0141:33, the captain said, "look carefully" and "set five hundred sixty feet" (the published MDA). The FAA The Board explained that it was not the intent of this recommendation to have a controller workstation be designed for the supervisor but rather to enable the supervisor to be "in the loop" if an MSAW alert was generated. The KCAB was initially assessed in 1996 and was given a Category I rating. As a result, the Safety Board classified Safety Recommendation A-97-24 "Closed--Acceptable Action" on January 14, 1999. The accident occurred after midnight (about 0042) in the flight crew's home time zone (which is 1 hour behind Guam local time). the indications available in the airplane) and the manufacturers' recommended ground
Korean Air stated that, in March 1999, it began issuing "flight-specific manual packages" to outbound crews to ensure that pilots possessed updated route information for each trip.
12 spoiler positions--were not reflected in the FDR documentation provided by the manufacturer or the airline at the time of the initial FDR readout. He was previously a navigator in the Republic of Korea Air Force. The Board also noted that the FAA had reemphasized that these procedures be followed when conducting a periodic review of an instrument procedure. The pilots also performed the localizer approach to runway 14 at Kimpo once and the VOR/DME approach to runway 32 at Kimpo five times. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB… The visual warning information is provided to the pilot using the color graphics capabilities of a dedicated display screen, the color weather radar, or an Electronic Flight Instrument System map display (depending on the particular installation).
In May 1999, Korean Air announced it would replace the existing CRM program with a new CRM program that was developed with and adopted from Delta Air Lines. Therefore, Safety Recommendation A-94-186 was classified "Closed-- Acceptable Action.
The new program will consist of four courses: a base course, a course for new captains, a recurrent course, and a recurrent joint flight operations/cabin services course.In addition to the changes being implemented in response to the MOCT action and as part of the Immediate Action Plan and the new CRM program, Korean Air indicated that it has made other changes in the area of flight training.
According to Federal dispatch facility logs, that station was not notified of the accident until 0234. FAA's role would be to ensure that U.S. carriers have a credible process in place to provide such assurances. See section 1.17.3 for additional information.VOR/DME stands for very high frequency omnidirectional radio range/distance measuring equipment. Specifically, the captain's briefing included a reminder that the glideslope was inoperative, some details of the radio setup, the localizer-only MDA, the missed approach procedure, and the visibility at Guam (stated by the captain to be 6 miles). According to the FAA, this order contains criteria for design of stand-alone area navigation approaches using barometric VNAV guidance on the final approach segment. About 1 second later, the flight engineer stated, "not in sight," and the first officer said, "not in sight, missed approach."
Korean Air Flight 801 - Aircraft Accident Report (NTSB) National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations — 4.
High TSA crews made significantly more procedural errors and tactical decision errors than low TSA crews. On April 24, 1995, the Safety Board expressed its disappointment that AC 120-51B On June 16, 1995, the FAA stated that, on April 21, 1995, it had issued a final rule to amend the pilot qualification requirements for air carrier and commercial operators. The Board calls technical experts as witnesses to testify, and Board investigative staff and designated representatives from the parties to the investigation ask questions to glean factual information.
Additionally, the FAA stated that, on May 26, 1998, it issued Order 8260.47, "Barometric Vertical Navigation (VNAV) Instrument Procedures Development."
Upon arrival, she noted that the triage and transportation activities were "functioning well" but that medical and evacuation efforts lacked coordination.